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Ranking Research Performance in the United Kingdom 
In the last decades, most countries in the western world have introduced some form of centralized 
quality assessment and control in academia (Geuna, Martin 2003; Paradeise et al. 2009). New 
technologies of control and measurement have been implemented in higher education systems, with 
‘quality’ and ‘excellence’ becoming catchphrases for governance regimes that are located at the inter-
face of the state, the market, and academia (Maeße 2016; Münch 2014). Ranking systems and league 
tables are proven devices that rank order the results of evaluations and visualize them for a broader 
public (Shin et al. 2011). 
One of the earliest attempts to systematically assess research performance and rank respective 
institutions has been made in the United Kingdom (UK). Since 1986, assessments of research quality 
are delivered roughly every five years by the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and, since 2014, by 
the Research Excellence Framework (REF). The assessments can therefore be considered to be 
amongst the most sophisticated research performance assessments in the world.1 They follow a seem-
ingly straightforward principle: “Institutions conducting the best research receive a larger proportion of 
the available grant so that the infrastructure for the top level of research in the UK is protected and 
developed.” (RAE 2001c) The idea is to identify where to allocate scarce resources, to compare research 
performance within and between departments and universities, and to concentrate funds in selected 
institutions. Rankings play an important role in this set-up. 
The assessments grade – and thus, quantify – the quality of research across dozens of fields and 
more than 150 institutions. They are conducted by the four UK higher education funding bodies and 
based on a peer review system that is organized in subject-specific assessment panels. The panels are 
charged with “identifying excellence in the rich diversity of research” (REF 2012) they cover. The panels 
                                                          
1
 Studies on the evolution of the RAE/REF over the years abound (Bence, Oppenheim 2005; Martin, 
Whitley 2010). While the RAE 2001 has above all been characterized by a grade inflation and a 
subsequently more concentrated funding policy by the Higher Education Funding Council for England, 
the main change in the RAE 2008 was the introduction of research profiles for each department, based 
on what proportion of its publications was judged to be of national or international quality. The most 
important novelty of the REF is that ‘output quality’ (now weighed at 65 percent) is supplemented with 
‘impact’ (20 percent) and ‘research environment’ (15 percent) (REF 2011). 
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evaluate most notably research output (normally publications) from designated research staff that has 
been selected for assessment by the respective higher education institutions. Hence, the subject pan-
els have to assess a broad variety of research that is conducted in hyper-differentiated research fields. 
This process can be expected to be extremely intricate and complicated (Sharp, Coleman 2005; cf. 
Lamont, Huutoniemi 2011). Nonetheless, in the end a grade system is employed that appears rather 
simplistic and vague (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Definition of Research Quality According to RAE 2008 and REF 2014 
Rating Description 
4* Quality that is world-leading in terms of originality, significance and rigour 
3* 
Quality that is internationally excellent in terms of originality, significance 
and rigour but which nonetheless falls short of the highest standards of 
excellence 
2* 
Quality that is recognised internationally in terms of originality, significance 
and rigour 
1* 
Quality that is recognised nationally in terms of originality, significance and 
rigour 
Unclassified 
Quality that falls below the standard of nationally recognised work. Or work 
which does not meet the published definition of research for the purposes 
of this assessment. 
Sources: (RAE 2008b; REF 2011) 
Based on the grade system displayed in Table 1, the most recent REF 2014 assessed the research of 
52,061 researchers at 154 universities. Overall, 76 percent of all submissions have been awarded with 
the two best grades, 4* and 3* (cf. REF 2014b, 2014c). This share is crucial, because the assessments 
are more than just symbolic distinctions. If this were the case, they would be open to interpretation. 
Merely symbolic assessment results would have their own potency, but in the end they would be fuzzy 
enough to be contested, or even ignored – in fact, this is the case with a number of rankings in the 
higher education sector. However, as it is, the RAE/REF assessments are translated into very robust 
material classes because they inform the allocation of public research funding by the UK funding coun-
cils. The most recent REF, for example, is used to allocate £1.6 billion annually for the next six years. 
Eighty percent of these funds are distributed among departments rated 4*, 20 percent are going to 3* 
research, while other grade scales are not funded (Wilsdon 2015; HEFCE 2015). This material founda-
tion underscores the vital significance the assessments have for the academic landscape in the UK. 
The very selective distribution of funds seems to rectify the quite generous grading that is carried out 
by the subject-specific panels. 
This paper proceeds with a brief review of the literature on rankings in the higher education sector. 
It distinguishes literature on standardization effects and on stratification effects. The main section of 
the paper presents different rankings that are produced from the RAE/REF data. Among them are 
rankings produced directly by the RAE/REF, and rankings that media outlets produce drawing on the 
RAE/REF data. Informed by case examples, the closing section discusses the performativity of rankings. 
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It looks into the different implications and effects rankings and the associated performance assess-
ments have on higher education institutions, their personnel, and the personnel’s practices. 
Ranking Research: Effects and Defects 
The RAE/REF have been evaluating research in the UK since the 1980s. Since the very beginning, the 
assessments have been scrutinized by research on performance assessments and rankings. Overall, 
the assessments have responded to the critique they received, thereby becoming more and more 
differentiated and elaborate. Hence, it is worthwhile to retrace the co-evolution of technical critique of 
criteria, calculation, and compilation of the rankings, as well as their actual development (cf. Tomlin 
1998). However, not every shortcoming of research performance assessment can be addressed by 
reforming the assessment device, and indeed, the question is whether effects that are identified as 
shortcomings in the literature are actually deficiencies, or, instead, very much intended consequences. 
Some effects, intended or not, are more fundamentally part of the very nature of research perfor-
mance assessment. Two such symptoms are highlighted in the following. 
One body of literature addresses symptoms of adaption to the criteria of performance assess-
ments (Espeland, Sauder 2007). Adaptions of academic practice have been identified for a number of 
western countries (cf. Benner, Sandström 2000 for Sweden; Harman 2005 for Australia; Münch 2008 
for Germany; Leišytė, Westerheijden 2014 for the Netherlands; Sayer 2014 for the UK) and for several 
disciplines (cf. Campbell et al. 1999 for law studies; Morris, Rip 2006 for neuro sciences; Kehm, Leišytė 
2010 for medieval history; Lee et al. 2013 for economics; Hamann 2016 for history). In all cases, 
assessments seem to have the effect that researchers stay mostly within the mainstream areas of 
their field in order to maintain chances of receiving funding. In light of these developments, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to determine research excellence, since adaptations to the assessment criteria – 
and panel members’ reluctance to penalize their own field – produce ever increasing proportions of 
‘excellent’ research (Tapper, Salter 2004; Wooding et al. 2015).  
In addition to literature on standardization symptoms, a second body of literature discusses 
stratification effects of research performance assessments, rankings, and the allocation of resources. 
Focusing on new strata of managerial accountability, studies have revealed that status assignments 
create new patterns of authority (Whitley et al. 2010), for example between panel members and the 
colleagues whose research they are judging (Sharp, Coleman 2005; Sayer 2014), between research 
active personnel and teaching oriented personnel (Elton 2000; Tapper, Salter 2002), or between 
university management and the departments in which they intervene (Henkel 1999; Yokoyama 2006). 
It has been argued that effects of academic elitism and stratification are not limited to the academic 
field, but occur in other societal realms as well (Maeße 2016; cf. Maeße, Hamann 2016). This body of 
literature understands procedures of resource distribution as mechanisms for the construction of 
status hierarchies. The identification of ‘excellence’ is thus impeded by the structurally unequal 
distribution of social, economic, and symbolic resources (Burris 2004; Morgan 2004; Münch 2008; 
Hamann 2017). 
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Ranking Research Performance: the Rankings Produced by the 
RAE/REF 
Most rankings in the higher education sector are produced and distributed by single sources. Among 
these are consultancies, as is the case for the so-called Shanghai Ranking, think tanks like the German 
Center for Higher Education Development (CHE), news outlets, such as the Canadian magazine 
Maclean’s and The Economist, or political actors like the United States National Research Council. In 
the current case example, rankings are not only produced by the RAEs/REF themselves – and thus, 
indirectly, by the four UK funding councils that organize them – but also by media outlets like the 
Times Higher Education magazine (THE) and The Guardian. It is a peculiarity of the current example 
that media outlets not only distribute existing rankings, but also produce their own versions that draw 
on the RAE/REF data. From this emerges a variety of rankings illustrating how the RAEs/REF’s influence 
goes beyond funding policy. The rankings also shape the public perception of departments in a way 
that seems to be unique to the UK. This section discusses two ‘generations’ of RAE/REF rankings as well 
as The Guardian and THE rankings. 
The rankings produced by the RAE 2001 proceed either from different subjects within one higher 
education institution (see Figure 1-1 for the University of Cambridge), or from departments at different 
higher education institutions that are ranked according to the same subject (see Figure 1-2 for history). 
The first column, “2001 rating”, designates the assigned grade. The second column, “proportion of staff 
selected”, states the number of faculty members within a department who have been registered as 
researchers and thus have their research assessed.2 The column on the very right designates the num-
ber of full-time equivalent (FTE) research positions at a department. 
Two aspects seem worth highlighting for the RAE 2001 rankings in Figures 1-1 and 1-2. First, the 
assessment itself simultaneously produces rankings for universities (Figure 1-1) and for departments 
(Figure 1-2). In other words, the assessment offers two competing perspectives that draw on two dis-
tinct levels of comparison: an inter- and an intra-university perspective. It seems counterintuitive for a 
ranking to operate on two equally important comparative orders. Second, the rank order in both rank-
ings is numerical when it follows the order of the subject areas that have been assessed at a higher 
education institution (Figure 1-1), and alphabetical when it ranks the departments that have been 
assessed in one subject area (Figure 1-2). A performance-based ranking is only available when the data 
is downloaded in an Excel file. 
                                                          
2
 A = 95–100 percent of the staff at a department, B = 80–94.9 percent of the staff, C = 60–79.9 percent, 
etc. 
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Source: (RAE 2001a) 
Figure 1-1: RAE 2001 ranking by higher education institution 
 
Source: (RAE 2001b) 
Figure 1-2: RAE 2001 ranking by subject 
Thirteen years and two assessments later, the REF 2014 rankings still offer two competing levels of 
comparison and employ numerical and alphabetical rank orders (Figures 2-1, 2-2). However, there has 
been an important innovation since 2001. Results are published as graded quality profiles rather than 
fixed point scales. This was supposed to allow the funding bodies to “identify pockets of excellence 
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wherever these might be found”, and to reduce the “'cliff edge' effect where fine judgements at the 
grade boundaries could have significant funding impacts” (RAE 2008a). 
 
 
Source: (REF 2014c) 
Figure 2-1: REF 2014 ranking by subject 
 
Source: (REF 2014b) 
Figure 2-2: REF 2014 ranking by institution 
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Looking more closely at Figures 2-1 and 2-2, we also see that research performance has been 
differentiated. Going beyond a general statement on quality, which is still included in the category 
‘overall quality’, three elements of assessment distinguish, first, research output, covering mainly 
publications; second, the research environment of a department, ranging from the number of PhD 
students over cooperation to third party funding; and third, the ‘societal impact’ of research, which is 
supposed to capture the social relevance of research (REF 2011, 2014a). Thus, in both Figures 2-1 and 
2-2, the rankings depict overall quality profiles as well as the sub-profiles regarding research output, 
societal impact, and research environment that are awarded to each submission. Overall quality pro-
files show the proportion judged to meet each starred level, while sub-profiles show the proportion of 
research output, societal impact, and research environment judged to meet each starred level. 
In addition to the rankings that are produced directly by the RAE/REF, media outlets take up the 
assessment results in order to construct their own rankings from the data.3 The Guardian, for exam-
ple, published a ‘Power Ranking’ by Research Fortnight, a newsletter on research policy (Figure 3). The 
‘Power Ranking’ does not depict research performance, but research funding – or, to be more precise, 
expected research funding. 
 
 
Source: (The Guardian 2014) 
Figure 3: Research Fortnight’s ‘Power Ranking’ in The Guardian, based on the REF 2014 
The ‘Power Ranking’ is based on the following metrics (weighted by research staff): Power rating in 
column six, depicting how the university’s Quality Index score relates to the top performing university, 
in this case Oxford; Quality Index in column seven, a weighting of the university’s score based on the 
expected funding allocation; and Market share in column eight, illustrating how much Research Fort-
night predicts the university will get of the overall available funding next year based on its results. 
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 Both rankings discussed in the following were published on the same day or one day after the REF 
2014 results were officially published. This demonstrates the high significance this topic has in UK 
media. 
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According to the self-description, the “rankings reflect what the REF is about, i.e., the money” (The 
Guardian 2014). 
Times Higher Education, a London-based magazine publishing its own influential World University 
Rankings, is another media outlet that dissects the RAE/REF results in order to build its own rankings. 
From this data, THE offers alternative rankings, among them an ‘Intensity Ranking’ that sets out to map 
university performance against the proportion of eligible research staff submitted (Times Higher 
Education 2014c), a ‘Table of Excellence’ that ranks institutions according to the average points of their 
overall quality profiles (Times Higher Education 2014b), and subject ratings that rank departments 
according to their grades in different subjects (Figure 4). 
 
 
Source: (Times Higher Education 2014a) 
Figure 4: Times Higher Education ranking by subject, based on the REF 2014 
In THE’s subject ranking, ranks are mainly assigned by the grade point average (GPA) of the overall 
quality profiles, which in turn are made up of the sub-profiles for research output, societal impact, and 
research environment. The GPAs are compared to GPAs of the previous RAE 2008 assessment. THE’s 
use of average points is worth highlighting because it subverts the idea of concentrating on differenti-
ated profiles, and instead aggregates these (back) to simple numeric measures. While the REF itself 
does not produce or use GPAs, it is no coincidence that THE draws on a measure that is supposedly 
more marketable in mass media. 
The Performativity of Rankings: what are Rankings actually doing? 
Instead of a conclusion, the paper closes with a reflection on a couple of effects and implications of 
higher education rankings in general and the RAE/REF rankings in particular. Not all of the following 
points are effects of rankings according to a narrow statistical notion of causality. They can partially be 
ascribed to research performance assessment in the broader sense, and thus refer back to the litera-
ture reviewed in a previous section of this paper. In combination with the literature review, this section 
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also indicates hitherto neglected effects that future research will have to concentrate on, for example 
systematic disciplinary comparisons and perspectives that focus on the social processes that rankings 
build on. 
First, rankings construct research fields. Any research activity that is submitted for assessment has 
to be assigned to a subject area, which is called Unit of Assessment (UoA) in assessment lingo. Some 
UoAs comprise traditional academic disciplines, for example, physics (UoA9). However, the grid of the 
UoAs does not necessarily follow disciplinary distinctions. For instance, depending on their specializa-
tion, physicians can submit their research to no less than four UoAs (UoA1 ‘Clinical Medicine’; UoA2 
‘Public Health, Health Services and Primary Care’; UoA3 ‘Allied Health Professions, Dentistry, Nursing 
and Pharmacy’; UoA4 ‘Psychology, Psychiatry and Neuroscience’). In the end, this institutional structure 
determines how research is represented, perceived, and funded. Applying a unified matrix to elements 
that are different in nature, the formalized grid of the RAE/REF is an example of a process that has 
been described as commensuration (cf. Espeland, Stevens 1998). 
Second, rankings reduce complexity. They make ‘research quality’, a very complicated, ambiguous, 
and vague notion that is constructed anew in every specific situation (Lamont 2009), comparable by 
translating it into numbers. This ambitious task is entrusted to peers in the subject panels, who review 
each submission and grade it according to the uniform grade system. Usually, quality is only intelligible 
to members of the same hyper-differentiated sub-sub-discipline. The rankings, conversely, make 
researchers and their performance comparable and governable (cf. Bovens et al. 2014; Morrissey 2013). 
Third, rankings visualize performance differences. Building on the reduction of complexity 
described in the previous paragraph, rankings compare research outputs and distinguish higher 
education institutions according to the differences that have been determined. Rankings present these 
hierarchical differences to the public. The RAE was introduced along with New Public Management 
measures in the 1980s. For this neoliberal governance approach, the public visibility of performance 
differences is an important contribution of rankings. It allows for transparency and public accountability, 
and thus signals the trustworthiness of the funding system (cf. Strathern 2000a, 2000b). 
Fourth, rankings legitimize funding decisions. The RAE/REF rankings reveal on which basis the UK 
higher education funding bodies make their funding decisions. The rankings illustrate, for example, 
why the University of Cambridge receives a particular amount of funding while Plymouth University 
receives a different amount, and they show why some philosophy departments receive less money 
than clinical medicine institutions. In this light, rankings are devices that facilitate negotiations about 
funding decisions in the first place; they further legitimize and thus stabilize evaluative decisions (cf. 
Walker et al. 1986). 
Fifth, rankings standardize research. The literature strongly suggests that rankings and perfor-
mance assessments encourage researchers to concentrate on risk-averse normal science. Indeed, the 
literature on RAE/REF shows that the assessments reward articles in high impact journals in disciplines 
as diverse as neurosciences (Morris, Rip 2006), history (Hamann 2016), law (Campbell et al. 1999), or 
economics (Lee et al. 2013). Scholarship on performance assessment explains this with the reactivity 
of rankings that standardize research by rewarding the adaption to assessment criteria (cf. Espeland, 
Sauder 2007). 
Sixth, rankings stratify the higher education landscape. While the RAE/REF employ a meritocratic 
rhetoric, stating that “institutions conducting the best research receive a larger proportion of the 
available grant” (RAE 2001c), they also reproduce existing inequalities in the distribution of resources 
in the field. Economic, social, and symbolic resources correlate with respective ranks (Münch, Schäfer 
2014; Hamann 2017). By rewarding higher education institutions that already have greater resources 
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at their disposal, the rankings not only consecrate and legitimize existing inequalities (cf. Merton 1968 
on the Matthew effect), but also further reproduce stratifications (cf. Bourdieu 1988). These inequalities 
are not necessarily based on research performance (alone). 
The manifold performativity of rankings demonstrates that rankings have a number of effects and 
implications – in other words, rankings do a number of quite diverse things. According to perspectives 
in cultural sociology, modern capitalist societies tend to credentialize power with certificates, degrees, 
and other labels (Collins 1979; Bourdieu et al. 1981). In this view, rankings create symbolic dominance 
by commensurating different entities, constructing distinctions and comparisons, making visible differ-
ences, and consecrating those at the top of the ranking. However, the rankings that are produced from 
the RAE/REF are fertile illustrative material because, unlike a number of other rankings in the higher 
education sector, they go beyond symbolic differences and distinctions. They are devices that couple 
rank order with research funding, and thus develop the potency to influence and sustainably modify 
higher education by standardizing research and reproducing structural inequalities. Thus, from a 
materialist perspective of political economy (Maeße 2015; Jessop et al. 2008), the current case example 
illustrates how symbolic differences are translated into material classes, and how material classes are 
in turn legitimized by symbolic consecration (Bourdieu 1988). 
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